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ABSTRACT
In scenarios where a robot generates and executes a plan, there may
be instances where this generated plan is less costly for the robot
to execute but incomprehensible to the human. When the human
acts as a supervisor and is held accountable for the robot’s plan, the
human may be at a higher risk if the incomprehensible behavior
is deemed to be infeasible or unsafe. In such cases, the robot, who
may be unaware of the human’s exact expectations, may choose
to execute (1) the most constrained plan (i.e. one preferred by all
possible supervisors) incurring the added cost of executing highly
sub-optimal behavior when the human is monitoring it and (2)
deviate to a more optimal plan when the human looks away. While
robots do not have human-like ulterior motives (such as being lazy),
such behavior may occur because the robot has to cater to the
needs of different human supervisors. In such settings, the robot,
being a rational agent, should take any chance it gets to deviate to
a lower cost plan. On the other hand, continuous monitoring of the
robot’s behavior is often difficult for humans because it costs them
valuable resources (e.g., time, cognitive overload, etc.). Thus, to
optimize the cost for monitoring while ensuring the robots follow
the safe behavior, we model this problem in the game-theoretic
framework of trust. In settings where the human does not initially
trust the robot, pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium provides a useful
policy for the human. Unfortunately, in our setting, the formulated
game often lacks a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus, we define
the concept of a trust boundary over the mixed strategy space of the
human and show how it helps to discover monitoring strategies that
ensures the robot adheres to safe behavior and achieves the goal.
With the help of human studies and task-planning scenarios, we
justify the need for coming up with optimal monitoring strategies
(in supervision scenarios) and showcase their effectiveness.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In a multi-agent scenario involving a robot (R), who is making and
executing a plan (or policy) in the world, and a human (H ), who is
responsible for the outcome of the robot’s actions, has to have trust
in the robot because the human cannot always spend their valuable
resources (like time, cognitive effort, etc.) in monitoring the robot’s
plans (or execution of these plans) and intervening whenever neces-
sary. Such scenarios are ubiquitous in human-human teams where
one human is in charge of making and executing plans in order to
achieve a goal (e.g., a software developer), while another human is
∗indicates equal contribution. Names ordered based on a coin flip.
responsible for ensuring the goal is achieved while ensuring other
soft metrics are met (e.g., a software development manager).
The worker robot, in our case, is unaware of the human’s exact
modelMRH that describes the safety requirements the supervisor has
in mind but has knowledge about all the possible setsMRH of safety
constraints the human might have, i.e., MRH ∈ MRH . In short, the
safety constraints laid out by the human supervisors are a known-
unknown. This, coupled with the fact that sometimes the human
does not observe the robot’s plan or its execution, incentivizes the
robot to execute a less costly plan (πpr ) that may be probably risky
and deemed as unsafe by at least one human whose model belongs
to the setMRH . The alternative for the robot would be to execute
the plan πs , which although safe for all models ∈ MRH , has a high
cost for the robot.
In this paper, we introduce a notion of trust that a human super-
visor H places on a worker robot R when H chooses to not observe
R’s plan or its execution by modeling the interaction in a game-
theoretic framework of trust motivated by [9]. The uncertainty
about the human’s model that R has is reflected in the utilities,
making our formulated game a Bayesian one. In the scenario of
no trust, i.e. the case where if H does not observe, R will always
deviate to a plan that is less costly for itself, we show that H can
have a probabilistic observation strategy that ensures (1) R does
not deviate away from executing the safest plan (i.e., executable
in all the models ofMRH ) and also, (2) H saves valuable resources
(such as time, effort, etc.) as opposed to continually monitoring R.
Given that in any monitoring scenario humans have to come up
with a supervision strategy, we conduct human studies to figure
out the natural strategies that they would follow. First, we show
that in such supervision or monitoring scenarios, humans may
either be risk-averse (ensures that the robot does the right thing, no
matter the monitoring cost) or risk-taking (in the hope to minimize
their cost, will choose to cut down their monitoring time). This
result justifies the Bayesian modeling of our human player in the
game-theoretic framework for the supervision scenario. Second,
we show, in contrast to work in existing human-aware planning
scenarios where humans are asked to monitor the robot all the time
[2, 6], humans often deviate to more split-time strategies where
some of the time, originally meant for monitoring, can be used for
other tasks and still ensure the robot adheres to constraints. Thus,
it makes sense to analyse the supervision scenario formally and
provide human agents with optimal monitoring strategies that let
them maximize their utility while ensuring the supervised agent R
does not execute behavior that is either unsafe or fails to achieve
the goal. Lastly, via analysis of answers to subjective questions, we
show that participants who undertook the study would prefer a
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software that (can use our game-theoretic formulation and) provide
them with an optimal monitoring strategy.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our work is situated at the middle of the spectrum that ranges
from fully co-operative settings to fully-adversarial ones. In fully-
cooperative settings, the robot only considers the human’s goals
and thus, can only exhibit undesirable behavior because of either
impreciseness in or differences between its own modelMR and the
human’s expectationMRH .
In motion and task planning, researchers argue that if the robot
follows a plan that adheres to the human’s expectation, i.e., is
optimal inMRH ; then these plans are deemed to be explicable [14],
legible [2], or adhers to social norms [5]. They assume that the
need for R to be explicable, legible, etc. is because the human is
continuously observing or monitoring the robot. Although they
do not explicitly discuss, in scenarios where the human is not
observing the robot, it may deviate to a plan that is optimal in
MR . In our setting, this deviation can result in the violation of
safety constraints and hence we want to ensure that even when the
human is not spending all their resources in observing R, the robot
does not deviate from the safe plan πs . Furthermore, the existing
works [2, 5, 14] assume that all the humans who observe the robot
have the same expectation, i.e., MRH is a singleton set, which is
either fully known beforehand or can be easily learned. Some recent
works, such as [3], that try to address this concern, consider the
imprecise specification of the human’s reward (which can be a
part ofMRH ). Then they show how it results in the robot executing
undesired behaviors that may be deemed unsafe. Eventually, they
conclude that some uncertainty aboutMRH may result in R doubting
its current behavior as unsafe and in turn, letting the human take
control (switch it off) if necessary. Unfortunately, they consider
that R’s objective is solely to maximize the human’s reward and
thus, robots have no reason to think of other rewards. Although
the robot many not have ulterior motives like human agents, the
assumption falls flat when the robot is (1) rented out as a service
by a third-party agent for helping a particular human (autonomous
car offered by ride-sharing apps), or (2) is catering to the needs of
multiple supervisors. In such scenarios, a single human’s reward is
not its sole reward anymore. We seek to address such scenarios in
this work. Although, similar to our work, researchers have looked
at the idea of considering multiple human models, they mostly
address the problem generating robust explanations [13].
Given that we are trying to find an monitoring strategy for the
human supervisor so that the robot always chooses to execute
πs even if there exists uncertainty about the human’s model, we
should situate our-self to works in the other end of the spectrum
that deal with adversarial monitoring in physical [8, 12] and cyber
domains [10, 11]. A key difference with these works is that they
lack any notion of co-operation. In our case, if the robot R is unable
to achieve the (team) goal due to violation of certain constraints
and insufficient monitoring, it results in an inconvenience for H
too, who will then be held responsible for their failure to (1) ensure
safety or (2) achieve the goal. Beyond these, our framework should
be seen as a first-step towards repeated game modeling that will
allow us to consider the development of trust on the robots and
eventually, finding methods to incentive the robot to identify and
respect that trust. Such intentions are clearly missing in adversarial
settings. Lastly, the notion of mixed strategies that are used in most
of these works does not sit well with our scenario because the
probabilistic guarantees about the robot behaving safely might not
be an acceptable solution in our settings. Thus, we can conclude that
although our problem shares properties of both fully co-operative
fully and adversarial settings, it exhibits significant differences to
resides in the middle of the aforementioned spectrum.
3 GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
Before describing the game-theoretic formulation–the actions and
the utilities of the agents– we first clearly highlight the assumptions
made about the two agents.
3.1 Assumptions about the Agents
The human H , who is a supervisor in our setting, has the fol-
lowing characteristics:
(1) H has a particular model of the robot R, denoted asMRH that
belongs to some set of possible modelsMRH .
(2) Upon observation of the plan that R comes up with or its
execution, if H believes the plan is risky (i.e., is inexecutable
or unsafe in their model MRH of the robot), H can stop the
execution at any point in time. If H stops the robot R from
executing its plan, H incurs some cost of inconvenience for
not having achieved the team goal G or because H should
stop the robot and make the robot to do the safe plan. This
seems pragmatic because H , being the supervisor, will be
held responsible for it.
(3) H has a positive cost for observing the robot’s plan or the
plan’s execution.
The Robot R, who is the agent being monitored, has the follow-
ing capabilities and assumptions associated with it:
(1) R is uncertain about the human’s model of it, i.e., MRH , but
knows that it belongs in the set of possible modelsMRH .
(2) R, given a sequential decision making problem, can come up
with two plans– (1) a safe plan (πs ) that is executable in all
models ∈ MRH and (2) a risky plan (πpr ) that is executable
in a subset ofMRH but in-executable (or unsafe) in the other
models.
(3) There are costs for coming up with the plans πs and πpr and
executing them. Also, since R may have to work on other
goals or cater to the needs of other supervisors, it would like
to execute πpr if it can get away with it.
(4) It incurs a cost for not achieving the team’s goal G. This
happens when the human observes the plan or execution
and stops it midway (due to safety concerns).
(5) The robot is not malicious and thus, does not lie. It won’t
bait-and-switch by showing one plan to H (that looks safe)
and then executing another.
With these assumptions in place, we can now define each play-
ers’ pure strategies and their utility values which will encode the
uncertainty about the types of human supervisor, turning the game
a Bayesian one.
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OP,¬E O¬P,E NO-OB
πpr
−CHP (πpr ) − IHP (πpr ),
−CRP (πpr ) −CRE¯ (πpr ) −C
R
G˜
−CHE (πˆ ) − IHE (πˆpr ),
−CRP (πpr ) −CRE (πˆ ) −CRG˜
−VHI (πpr ),
−CRP (πpr ) −CRE (πpr )
πs
−CHP (πs )
0︷   ︸︸   ︷
−IHP (πs ),
−CRP (πs ) −CRE (πs )
−CHE (πs )
0︷     ︸︸     ︷
−IHE (πˆH ),
−CRP (πs ) −CRE (πs )
0︷     ︸︸     ︷
−VHI (πs ),
−CRP (πs ) −CRE (πs )
Table 1: Normal-form game matrix for modeling the robot-monitoring scenario. R (H ) is the row (column) player.
3.2 Player Actions
In the normal form game matrix shown in Table 1, the row-player is
the robot R who has two pure strategies to choose from– the plans
πpr and πs (as described above). The column player is the human
H who has three strategies– (1) to only observe the plan made by
the robotOP,¬E and decide whether to let it execute (or not), (2) to
only observe the executionO¬P,E and stop R from executing at any
point, and (3) not to monitor (or observe) the robot at all (NO-OB).
A few underlying assumptions that are inherent part in our
action definitions are (1) the robot cannot switch from a plan (or a
policy) it has committed to a different one in the execution phase
and (2) the human only stops the robot from executing the plan if
they believe that the robot’s plan does not achieve the goal G as
per their actual model, i.e. the robot’s plan is deemed in-executable
(or unsafe) given the domain modelMRH .
3.3 Utilities
The utility values for both the players are indicated in the game-
matrix shown in Table 1. In each cell, corresponding to the pure-
strategy pair played by the two players, the numbers shown at
the bottom in black are the utility values for R while the ones at
the top in blue are the utility values for H . We now describe the
utilities for each player in our formulated game and later, in the
experimental section, talk about how they can be obtained in the
context of existing task-planning domains.
Robot’s Utility Values. We first describe the notation pertain-
ing to the robot utilities and then use them to compose the utilities
for each action pair.
CRP (π ) Cost of making a plan π .
CRE (π ) Cost to robot for executing plan π .
CR
G˜
Penalty of not achieving the goal G.
Note that we use the variables C to represent a non-negative
cost or penalty. Thus, the rewards for the robot R shown in Table
1 have a negative sign before the cost and penalty terms. As the
human may choose to stop the execution of a plan midway, the
robot might have executed a part of the original plan. We denote
this partial plan by πˆpr . Given this, the term CRE (πˆpr ) represents
the cost of executing the partial plan.
The uncertainty in the robot’s mind as to whether a particular
supervisor type will let it execute the plan πpr to completion can
now be captured using the variable CR
G˜
that represents the cost of
not achieving the goal. Before we discuss how one can model the
variable CR
G˜
, let us first briefly talk about the robustness r of the
plan πpr . The parameter r ∈ (0, 1] represents the fraction of models
inMRH where the plan πpr is executable (and thus, safe). A way
of obtaining this value for deterministic planning problems could
be the use of model counting [7]. For a given r , an idea to model
the cost associated with not achieving the goal is to consider CR
G˜
as a random variable drawn from the Bernoulli distribution s.t. CR
G˜
is a non-zero penalty if the plan is not robust enough for a given
human (with probability 1 − r ) or zero if it is (with probability r ).
Whenever the cost of not achieving the goal is equal to zero, it
means that the robot’s plan πpr (or its execution) was observed
by H nut not stopped by them. If the human chooses to observe
the plan before execution, then the cost incurred by the robot for
executing the plan πpr can be represented as,
CRE¯ (πpr ) =
{
CRE (πpr ) if CRG˜ = 0
0 o.w.
(1)
If the supervisor H , on the other hand, chooses to monitor the
execution directly, then the cost of execution would be,
CiE (πˆ ) =
{
CiE (πpr ) if CiG˜ = 0 i ∈ {R,H }
CiE (πˆpr ) o.w.
(2)
In the formulated game, the robot has to come up with a plan
(even though it may not be allowed to execute it). Thus, the cost
to come up with a plan (πs or πpr ) has to be considered for all the
utility values (in the respective rows). In the case of πs , since it is
executable in all the models ofMRH , there is no chance that H will
stop its execution and thus, no chance of incurring a penalty for
not achieving the goal.
Note that the cost of executing a plan that adheres to all the mod-
els inMRH is going to be high because it respects all the constraints
enforced by all the model (corresponding to all possible humans).
On the other hand, executing a plan πpr that respects constraints
corresponding to a subset of models inMRH would be less costlier
to execute. Thus, it is natural to assume CRE (πpr ) ≤ CRE (πs ).
Similarly, coming up with πpr may often be easy if the value
of r is small while coming up with the plan πs that is guaranteed
to work in all the models ofMRH may take a considerable longer
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amount of time. Hence, even for the planning time, we make the
logical assumption that CRP (πpr ) ≤ CRP (πs ).
Human’s Utility Values. We first describe the notations and
then use them to obtain the various utilities for the human.
CHP (π ) Cost w.r.t. human’s resources of observing the plan π
made by the robot.
CHE (π ) Cost w.r.t. human’s resources of observing the robot
execute the plan π .
VHI (π ) Cost incurred by the human, who was responsible for
the robot’s plan for violating a constraint that it had
set for the robot to follow and being ignorant about it.
Note that VHI (πs ) = 0
IHP (π ) Inconvenience to the human if they see a plan that it
cannot let the robot execute. Note that IHP (πs ) = 0.
IHE (π ) Inconvenience to the human if the human observes the
execution of an unsafe plan and it has to intervene or
stop from execution. Note that IHE (πs ) = 0.
Note that, in our setting, the human supervisor H will be held
responsible for not achieving the goal. This happens when H has
to stop the robot from executing the plan πpr . The inconvenience
cost can be represented using a negative utility for the human and
is denoted using the last two notations.
In our setting, after the robot comes with a plan, unless it is πs ,
the human H is not sure if the robot’s strategy will be executable
(or safe) in their modelMRH because the plan πpr is executable in
a subset of models which may not contain H’s model MRH . Thus,
they have some uncertainty over the variables VHI (π ), IHP (π ) and
IHE (π ). Thus, similar to the robots penalty, they can be represented
as random variables sampled from a Bernoulli distribution.
With probability (1−r ), when the robot chooses to come up (and
then execute) the plan πpr , if the human does not observe either of
the two processes, i.e., chooses NO-OB, then it is natural to assume
that the human, who is going to be held responsible for the plan
will eventually find out that constraints set by them was violated.
The cost incurred by the supervisor in this case (i.e. R plays πpr
and H plays NO-OB), should be the highest because (1) the robot,
without H ’s knowledge, violated some safety or social norm (that
was necessary for a plan to achieve the goal in MRH ), (2) H will
be held accountable for it, and (3) blamed for not fulfilling their
supervisory duties. Thus, we have,
VHI (πpr ) > CHP (πpr ) + IHP (πpr ) (3)
VHI (πpr ) > CHE (πˆ ) + IHE (πˆpr ) (4)
We also consider the cost of observing the execution of a plan is
greater than cost of observing the plan, i.e.
CHE (πˆ ) > CHP (πpr ) (5)
and the inconvenience caused by execution of a probably risky
(partial) plan is greater than inconvenience cause by just observing
the plan because no damage has yet been done. Thus,
IHE (πˆpr ) > IHP (πpr ) (6)
Lastly, note that when the robot comes up with a plan πs that is
executable in all the models ofMRH , the inconvenience (IHP (πs ) and
IHE (πs )) and responsibility (VHI (πs )) costs are zero. This is indicated
used curly braces in Table 1.
4 GAME-THEORETIC NOTION OF TRUST
In this section, we first define a notion of trust in the formulated
game shown in Table 1. H has three actions and as one goes from
left to right, the amount of trust H places in R, as defined in [9],
increases. Consider the human chooses not to observe the robots
plan or its execution, i.e., chooses NO-OB. Clearly, H exposes itself
a vulnerability because if R comes up with and executes πpr , it can
result in H getting a high negative reward VHI . On the other hand,
the robot may choose to respect the human’s trust by selecting
πs and therefore, not exploit the vulnerability that presents itself
when the human plays No-OB. On the other hand, if the human
chooses to observe the plan (OP,¬E ), the human is exposed to the
least amount of risk because the robot plan, even before it can
execute the first action, is verified by the human.
Note that H incurs a non-negative cost when playing the action
OP,¬E because it has to spend both time and effort in observing the
robots plan and then deciding whether to let it execute. In scenarios
when H cannot trust the robot and they have to play OP,¬E or
O¬P,E , they will incur the cost of constant monitoring. We now
discuss this case of no-trust in our game and see if it possible to
minimize this cost.
4.1 The No-Trust Scenario
In this setting, H should never play an action that exposes them
to a risk of a high negative utility because it does not trust R (who
will play πpr if H plays NO-OB). In such scenarios, if there exists
a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, then the players should play it
because neither of the players can deviate to get a better utility [9].
In our setting, this depends on the value of r , if r is high and close
to 1, it means that for most of the modelsMRH ∈ MRH , the plan πpr
is executable. Given we consider a Bayesian game, in order to have
the Nash Equilibrium we should satisfy the following condition
over the expected utility,
(1 − r )VHI (πpr ) < CHP (πpr ) + (1 − r )IHP (πpr )
CRP (πpr ) + (1 − r )CRG˜ + rC
R
E (πpr ) < CRP (πs ) +CRE (πs ) (7)
As r → 1, we can guarantee that (πpr ,NO −OB) is the Nash equi-
librium because πpr is executable in a large majority of the models
in MRH . In this case, with high probability, the human observer
(whose modelMRH is sampled from the setMRH ) has no preference
about the robot using πs over πpr . Thus, with high probability,
they will not incur VHI . Therefore, it makes sense for the robot R
to choose πpr that is less costlier.
Note that the above scenario is where r is closer to 1 is highly
unrealistic. It can only occur in domains where executing πpr does
not result in catastrophic circumstances or lead to in-feasibility,
implying the distinction between πs and πpr is hardly present. In
most real world settings, this would hardly be the case (i.e. r will
be much lower than 1), leading to the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The game defined in Table 1 has no pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium with the probability of (1 − r )
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Figure 1: The two plans, i.e the safe plan πs (left) and the probably-risky plan πpr (right) for the robot-delivery scenario.
Proof. The formulated game in this paper is a Bayesian game with
two player types for the human. The first type is the one where
πpr is executable in the model MRH in MRH , so CRG˜ = I
H
P (πpr ) =
IHE (πˆpr ) = VHI = 0, and the second type is represents the set of
humans whose models are in MRH and πpr is not executable in
them. Consequently, CR
G˜
, IHP (πpr ), IHE (πˆpr ) and VHI , 0. Given a
pure strategy Nash Eq. (as per equation 7) exists for the former, this
game has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with probability of r
(as r is also the probability of former type). □
Absence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. The absence
of a pure-strategy Nash eq. makes it difficult to define a human’s
best course of action in the no-trust setting [9]. Furthermore, ex-
isting works that assume the human should always monitor the
robot’s plan or behavior to ensure the robot plan is explicable [14]
or legible [2] (similar to πs in our setting) fail to account for the
human’s monitoring. This is unrealistic (rather, too costly) for H to
always select OP,¬E or O¬E,P in real-world settings. Furthermore,
the notion of a mixed-strategy (Nash) equilibrium is inappropriate
in our setting because a probabilistic play by R, i.e. choosing a risky
plan with some non-zero probability cannot guarantee safety or
feasibility for all human supervisors. Thus, we devise the notion of
a trust boundary that allows the human to play a mixed strategy
that reduces their cost of monitoring but ensures the robot always
sticks to selecting (and executing) πs .
Trust Boundary. Consider a human chooses the mixed strategy
®q = [(1 − qE − qN ),qE ,qN )]T over the actions OP,¬E ,O¬P,E and
NO-OB respectively. First, let us discuss what it means intuitively if
all the values are non-zero. The human probabilistically chooses to
look into the plan or execution of a plan done by the robot they are
supervising. Inmany human-human scenarios, such uncertainty (eg.
parents may come back) on the part of the supervising agent (say,
parents) might instill a fear in the supervised agent (say, children)
of getting caught if the latter choose to betray the supervisor (say,
watching TV (πpr ) instead of studying (πs ) when the parents are
out). Note that a strategy in qN = 1 will always result in the robot
choosing the probably risky plan (especially in our single-step
game). Thus, in order to ensure that the robot cannot deviate away
from the making and executing πs , we have to ensure that the
expected utility (U ) for the robot given ®q is greater for πs than for
πpr . Using the values defined in Table 1, this can be formally stated
as follows.
E ®q [U (πs )] > E ®q [U (πpr )] (8)
⇒ −CRP (πs ) −CRE (πs ) > (−CRP (πpr ) −CRG˜ −C
R
E¯ (πpr )) × (1 − qE − qN )
+(−CRP (πpr ) −CRE (πˆ ) −CRG˜ ) × qE
+(−CRP (πpr ) −CRE (πpr )) × qN
where E®q [U (π )] denotes the expected utility of the robot under the
human’s observation policy (or mixed strategy) ®q if it chooses to
make and execute the plan π . Note that the equation is linear w.r.t.
the variables qN and qE . Thus, there will be a region on one side
of the linear boundary where the robot always executes πs .
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EVALUATION
The aim of this section is to first describe a task-planning scenario
in which we can compute the trust boundary and then, perform
human subject studies in a simplified version of this supervision sce-
nario. To do so, we initially describe the robot-delivery domain that
we will use throughout the section. While most motion planning
scenarios only consider the execution phase (rather than modeling
both the planning and execution stages separately), task-planning
domains tend to concentrate on the planning phase of the problem.
Given that our game-theoretic model accounts for both the stages,
choosing an existing domain, which renders itself naturally to both
the planning and execution phases, is a challenging task. We choose
the robot-delivery domain because (1) we can use the task planning
domain definition as-is, and (2) the domain can be easily interpreted
for the execution stage. This gives a good scenario to model the
no-trust case with a human supervisor and a robot worker.
5.1 Robot Delivery Domain
We used a robot delivery domain [6] in which the robot can collect
and deliver parcels (thatmay not bewaterproof) or coffee by picking
it from the reception desk and taking it to a particular location.
The robot in the PDDL domain has the following actions: {pickup,
putdown, stack, unstack, move}.
Problem Instance. The problem instance in our setting has
the initial setting where (1) the robot is standing at a position
equidistant to the reception and the kitchen, (2) there is a parcel
located at the reception that is intended for the employee, (3) there
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is brewed coffee in the kitchen that needs to be delivered in a tray
to the employee. The goal for the robot is to collect and deliver the
coffee and the parcel to the employee.
Robot Plans. In Figure 1, we show two plans in which the robot
achieves the goal of collecting coffee from the kitchen and parcel
from the reception desk and delivers them to an employees’ desk. In
the plan shown of the left πs , the robot (1) collects coffee, (2) delivers
it to the employee, (3) goes back along the long corridor to collect
the parcel from the reception desk and finally (4) delivers it back to
the same employee. In the plan on the right πpr , the robot collects
coffee from the kitchen, (2) collects parcel from the reception desk
and puts them on the same tray and finally, (3) delivers both of
them to the employee.1
5.2 Computing the No-Trust Boundary in a
Task-Planning Scenario
In order to compute the trust boundary, we calculate the utility
values for our game leveraging Table 1 and the cost incurred by R
and H in this robot delivery domain. As we have different types
of costs for our game, we choose to normalize all of them to be
∈ [0, 1] and then used a multiplicative factor which represents the
significance of each cost type.
In this example, if the robot makes the πpr , it will be executable
(or safe) as per one of the two observers whose models make up the
setMRH . Thus, the robustness for πpr is r = 12 = 0.5. On the other
hand, the plan πs is executable (and thus, overall safe) in both the
models inMRH .
Robot Utility Values. We used the Fast Downward planner [4]
on the robot delivery domain [6] to find the execution costs for
R. For πpr with r = 0.5, it was (CRE (πpr ) =)10 while for πs , it was
(CRE (πs ) =)14. We note that the time for coming up with the plan πs
is 0.19s whereas it is 0.177s for coming up with πpr on a machine
with an Intel Xeon CPU (clock speed 3.4 Ghz) and 128GB RAM. The
unit for execution costs, although not well defined in PDDL models
can be a stand in for the fuel costs used up by the robot while the
planning costs is measured in seconds. Thus, we first normalize
the planning cost and then choose an appropriate prioritization
parameter to compare the planning and the execution costs. We
obtain CRP (πpr ) = 3.54 and CRP (πs ) = 3.8. Lastly, the penalty for
not achieving the goal is a random variable with the Bernoulli
distribution of (1 − r ) where CR
G˜
=
{
0 r
20 1 − r which is double the
size of the cost of execution in the non-zero case.
Given that the complexity of determining plan existence for clas-
sical planning problems is P-SPACE [1], a legitimate concern is how
realistic is the idea of solving two planning problems to obtain the
utility values for our game. To avoid this high computational cost,
we can solve a relaxed version of these planning problems to obtain
a approximation for the real plan cost. Note that this approximation
in the utility space, only necessary for large instances, can result in
sub-optimal monitoring strategies.
1Given the (actual and the human’s) domain models and the problem instance,
these plans can simply be computed using available open-source software like
Fast-Downward or web-services like planning.domains.
0 1
0
1
q
E
+
q
N
= 1
ab Explicable plans [6]
Legible plans [2]
qN
qE
Figure 2: An observation strategy in the trust region (shaded)
ensures that the robot sticks to πs . In contrast to observation
strategies discussed in existing works, one can reduce moni-
toring costs while ensuring explicable/legible/safe behavior.
Human Utility Values. We have two possible supervisors who
have two different mental models. In one model, the second plan
πpr is unsafe because the coffee and parcel taken in the same tray
runs the risk of the coffee spilling, thereby ruining the package.
In the other model, both plans are considered safe. Lastly, note
that the length of the corridor is a key factor in determining how
sub-optimal πs is for the robot to execute when compared to πpr
because, for πs , the robot requires an extra trip back to the reception
(i.e. two extra traversals of the corridor).
We consider the cost for the human to observe the plan to be
proportional to the planning time for R because the plans that took
a longer time to be built will needH to spend a longer time to reason
about it correctness and/or optimality. Thus, CHP (πpr ) = 0.885 and
CHP (πs ) = 0.95. The cost incurred by the human when they observe
the execution of plan πs is 8 while CHE (πpr ) = 4 assuming that the
cost of going through the long corridor is 2 (note that the difference
in observation cost increases as this value increases). However, if
the human thinks carrying the parcel and the coffee in a single tray
is unsafe, the cost of the observation of the partial execution of
the plan is 1.5 because it will stop the robot as soon as it tries to
put them on the same tray. For the inconvenience costs, we have
the Bernoulli distribution in which the non-zero case is the same
as the cost of observation for the safe plan, since if the robot does
something unsafe the human have to stop it and make it to do the
safe plan. So, we have
IHP =
{
0 r
0.95 1 − r and I
H
E =
{
0 r
8 1 − r
The cost VHI ’s can be calculated as the model difference between
the least and most constrained models inMRH in terms of the num-
ber of preconditions and effects of actions. Lastly, if an unsafe plan
runs to completion, the overall magnitude of this variable is higher.
After calculation, VHI =
{
0 r
20 1 − r .
We can now define the utility matrix for the players (R,H ) as
follows,
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Figure 3: Participant’s monitoring strategies acrossmultiple
trials. Trust boundary indicated using the black vertical line.
First type with probability 0.5:[ (−13.54,−0.885) (−13.54,−4) (−13.54, 0)
(−17.80,−0.95) (−17.80,−8.00) (−17.80, 0)
]
Second type with probability 0.5:[ (−23.54,−1.835) (−26.54,−9.5) (−13.54,−20)
(−17.80,−0.95) (−17.80,−8.00) (−17.80, 0)
]
5.3 Trust Boundary Calculation
According to Proposition 1, this game does not have a pure Nash Eq.
strategy with probability 0.5. Therefore, we now find the boundary
in the space of mixed strategies for second type of H who can
choose to adopt which will ensure that the robot always executes
πs . To do so, we use the values defined above and plug them into
equation 8 and obtain,
10 × qN − 3 × qE − 5.74 < 0 (9)
In Figure 2, we plot the trust boundary represented by the lines in
Eqn. 9 The three black lines (sides of the larger triangle) represent
the feasible region for the human’s mixed strategy ®q. Monitoring
strategy in the shaded region guarantees the robot, being a rational
agent, executes πs . The strategy that optimizesH ’s monitoring cost
and yet ensures the robot adheres to πs lies on the trust boundary
indicated using the red line. Note that existing work in task [6] and
motion [2] planning that ensures explicable and legible behavior
expects pure strategies for observing the plan and observing the ex-
ecution respectively. This restricts the humans to only two corners
of the feasible strategy space, hardly optimizing the human’s cost.
5.4 Human Studies
We designed a user-interface to represent the robot-delivery sce-
nario. The participants in the study play the role of a student in
a robotics department who are asked to monitor the robot for an
hour. In order to make the monitoring action be associated with a
cost, we added a second task in which participants could choose to
grade exam papers (and get paid for it) instead of just monitoring
the robot. For the simplicity of understanding and the scarcity of
participants who have experience as a professional supervisor, we
combine the actions to monitor the plan and monitor the execution
Figure 4: Average utility and its variance for each of the par-
ticipants across the five trials.
as a single ‘monitor the robot’ action. The other action ‘grade exam
papers’ represents the action to not-monitor the robot. As opposed
to asking the participants for mixed strategies over the two actions,
which is hard for them to interpret, we ask them to give us a time
slice for which they would choose a particular action (eg. 30 min-
utes to monitor the robot and 30 minutes to grade exam papers). We
provide the participants with their utility values for their actions
conditioned on the robot’s pure strategies (i.e. the plans πs and πpr ).
We inform them that the robot may have incentive to consider a less
costlier (but probably risky plan) depending on fraction of time allo-
cated for monitoring. We let each participant do five trials and after
each trial, the overall utility based on the participant’s monitoring
strategy and the robot’s strategy is reported to them. The robot
does not adapt itself to the human’s strategy in the previous trial
(which intents to preserve the non-repeated nature of our game).
A pilot study was first run on 4 participants whose feedback
helped us fix several issues in the interface that inhibited clarity.
We then collected data by asking 32 participants to undertake the
study. We obtained consent from each of the participants to use
their data and ensured that no group of participants colluded or
discussed the study results before their study finished. The par-
ticipants of this study were all graduate students across various
engineering departments at our university. The maximum time
taken by a participant to complete the study was 12 minutes while
most participants completed it within 5 minutes.
AggregateResults –Changes inMonitoring Strategy across
Trials. Note that a participant, given the information on the inter-
face, can formulate a simplified version of the game-theoretic model
proposed in this paper and find the optimal strategy for monitoring
(which is to monitor the robot for 0.327 or 19.62 minutes of an hour
and use the remaining time to grade papers). The participants’ time
slice allocated for monitoring, across the five trials, are shown in
Fig. 3. Given that there are only two actions for the participant, the
strategy can be represented using a singe variable (fraction to mon-
itor the robot) and thus, is plotted along the x-axis. The size of each
bubble is proportional to the number of participants who selected
a particular strategy. The optimal strategy is shown using a black
vertical line (i.e. x = 0.327). In the first trial, we noticed a small
subset of users (n = 5) calculate the (almost) optimal strategy using
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the utility values specified on the interface. Most of the other users
(n = 18) choose a risk-averse strategy, i.e. monitored the robot to
ensure it performs a safe plan even if it meant losing out on money
that could be earned from grading. The other 9 participants, in the
hope of making more money, spent a larger time grading papers
but, eventually ended up with a lower reward because the robot
performed the risky plan that failed to achieving the goal.
As the trials progressed, participants started discarding extreme
strategies (i.e. only monitor or only grade papers) and started con-
sidering strategies closer to the optimal. This only seems natural
given that we provided feedback after each trial. This feedback infor-
mation helped the participants, even the ones who didn’t leverage
the provided utility values to come up with a near-optimal strategy,
improve their strategies using trial-and-error. In Fig 3, note that for
the first two trials, the strategies are well spread out in the range
[0, 1] where as in the last two trials, the strategies are clustered
around the optimal decision boundary, with very few data points
below 0.25 and very few above 0.7.
Participant Types. In Figure 4, we plot the average utility of
each participant across five trials on the x-axis. The y-axis repre-
sents the variance. Highlighted in dark, at the bottom right, are five
participants that chose observation probabilities in the trust region
but not exactly at the trust boundary, i.e. sub-optimal w.r.t. the
optimal no-trust boundary strategy (at 0.327) that yields a reward
of 173.77. After that, they did behave in a greedy fashion to reduce
the observation time in the hope to make more money by grading
papers and stuck to the good policies they initially discovered. To-
wards the top-right corner, the set of points circled in light gray,
we saw a dense cluster of participants (= 15) who obtained a high
average utility but tried to tweak their strategies significantly, some-
times observing less and therefore, allowing the robot to choose
the riskier plan. which eventually lead to a large loss in reward.
In the context of the designed study, people who took higher
risks to gain more utility would have some correspondence, in the
context of our game-theoretic model, to people who would be fine
with letting the robot execute a riskier plan. Given that there is a
higher number of people, it would imply that the robot has a higher
chance of being monitored by a supervisor who would let them
execute πpr . Thus, a higher value of r . This fact makes it seem that
our solution has lesser significance because it is only necessary
1 − r% of the time. We point out this conclusion may be misplaced
given the playful nature of the setting where participants could
actually consider riskier strategies without the fear of actual loss of
financial utility or damage to their reputation. This may not hold
true for real-world settings where, we strongly believe, the value
of r may be lower.
Subjective Evaluation. We asked each participant two subjec-
tive questions. The first question asked the participants to discuss
their methodologies for coming upwith strategies. Out of the 30 par-
ticipants who answered this question, most of them correctly identi-
fied the tension that exists between choosing a relaxed monitoring
strategy and the robot considering unsafe behaviors. Although we
found that 12 participants identified the scenario as an optimization
problem, only five of them seemed to have been able to come up
with near-optimal strategy in the first trial. The other participants
mostly mentioned that they used a trial-and-error approach.
Figure 5: Word cloud of the answers to the subjective ques-
tion: If a software were to provide you with an optimal strat-
egy, would you follow it? (Feel free to explain why.)
The second question asked if they would be willing to consider
an algorithm providing them the optimal monitoring strategy given
a supervision scenario. As shown by the word-cloud in Fig 5, 24 out
of the 31 candidates who choose to answer the question, said yes.
They assumed that the software would (1) be fast and (2) maximize
their utility. While 3 participants were willing to use the software
as a sanity check as long as it did not force them to follow the
suggested strategy, 1 participant agreed to use the software only
for large scale problems. Lastly, 1 person said that they would place
their trust on the software if they knew that the developer had a
strong background in mathematics while the remaining 2 answered
no and maybe without any sort of justification.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We model the notion of trust that a human supervisor places on a
worker robot by modeling this interaction as a Bayesian Game. The
particular Human-Robot interaction setting situates our work at the
middle of the spectrum that ranges from fully-cooperative settings
on one end to fully-adversarial scenarios on the other. We show
that existing notions of game-theoretic trust break down in our
setting when the worker robot cannot be trusted due to the absence
of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Thus, we introduce a notion
of trust boundary that optimizes the supervisor’s monitoring cost
while ensuring that the robot workers stick to safe plans. Given that
supervisors or care takers often spend time working on side goals
(such as talking over the phone, sleeping, watching movies, etc.),
we carefully design a human study to see whether humans have
an inherent sense of good monitoring policies. Beyond objective
results, we show that most humans explicitly say that they would
prefer an algorithm that computes the optimal strategy for them
(in our case, located on an edge of the trust region).
Such strategies can also be useful in other scenarios where the
supervised agent is not a robot. Note that in those cases, the formu-
lation needs to capture the irrationality and computational capabil-
ities of the monitored agent. Beyond these, we plan to introduce
the notion of trust that is prevalent in repeated interaction settings.
An interesting problem that may occur in such settings is when the
robot primes the human to not observe its behavior by choosing
safe and sub-optimal behaviors (thereby engendering trust) and
finally breaks the human’s trust in a high-stake scenario.
8
Acknowledgments. This research is supported in part by the
ONR grants N00014-16-1-2892, N00014-18-1-2442, N00014-18-1-
2840, the AFOSR grant FA9550-18-1-0067, and the NASA grant
NNX17AD06G. Sailik Sengupta is supported by the IBM Ph.D. Fel-
lowship.
REFERENCES
[1] Tom Bylander. 1994. The computational complexity of propositional STRIPS
planning. Artificial Intelligence 69, 1-2 (1994), 165–204.
[2] Anca D Dragan, Kenton CT Lee, and Siddhartha S Srinivasa. 2013. Legibility and
predictability of robot motion. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM/IEEE international
conference on Human-robot interaction. IEEE Press, 301–308.
[3] Dylan Hadfield-Menell, Anca Dragan, Pieter Abbeel, and Stuart Russell. 2016.
The off-switch game. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.08219 (2016).
[4] Malte Helmert. 2006. The fast downward planning system. Journal of Artificial
Intelligence Research 26 (2006), 191–246.
[5] Uwe Köckemann, Federico Pecora, and Lars Karlsson. 2014. Grandpa Hates
Robots-Interaction Constraints for Planning in Inhabited Environments.. InAAAI.
2293–2299.
[6] Anagha Kulkarni, Tathagata Chakraborti, Yantian Zha, Satya Gautam Vadlamudi,
Yu Zhang, and Subbarao Kambhampati. 2016. Explicable robot planning as
minimizing distance from expected behavior. CoRR, abs/1611.05497 (2016).
[7] Tuan Nguyen, Sarath Sreedharan, and Subbarao Kambhampati. 2017. Robust
planning with incomplete domain models. Artificial Intelligence 245 (2017), 134–
161.
[8] Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P Pearce, Janusz Marecki, Milind Tambe, Fernando
Ordonez, and Sarit Kraus. 2008. Playing games for security: An efficient exact
algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games. In Proceedings of the 7th
international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems-
Volume 2. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, 895–902.
[9] Vidyaraman Sankaranarayanan, Madhusudhanan Chandrasekaran, and Shambhu
Upadhyaya. 2007. Towards modeling trust based decisions: a game theoretic
approach. In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security. Springer,
485–500.
[10] Aaron Schlenker, Omkar Thakoor, Haifeng Xu, Fei Fang, Milind Tambe, Long
Tran-Thanh, Phebe Vayanos, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. 2018. Deceiving cyber
adversaries: A game theoretic approach. In Proceedings of the 17th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. International Founda-
tion for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 892–900.
[11] Sailik Sengupta, Satya Gautam Vadlamudi, Subbarao Kambhampati, AdamDoupé,
Ziming Zhao, Marthony Taguinod, and Gail-Joon Ahn. 2017. A game theoretic
approach to strategy generation for moving target defense in web applications. In
Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 178–
186.
[12] Arunesh Sinha, Thanh H Nguyen, Debarun Kar, Matthew Brown, Milind Tambe,
and Albert Xin Jiang. 2015. From physical security to cybersecurity. Journal of
Cybersecurity 1, 1 (2015), 19–35.
[13] Sarath Sreedharan, Subbarao Kambhampati, et al. 2017. Explanations as Model
Reconciliation—A Multi-Agent Perspective. In 2017 AAAI Fall Symposium Series.
[14] Yu Zhang, Sarath Sreedharan, Anagha Kulkarni, Tathagata Chakraborti,
Hankz Hankui Zhuo, and Subbarao Kambhampati. 2017. Plan explicability and
predictability for robot task planning. In Robotics and Automation (ICRA), 2017
IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 1313–1320.
9
